The Shia doctrine of taqiyya is often criticized by Sunnis as permitting dissimulation (concealing one's faith) under persecution. Historically, Sunni scholars accused Shia Muslims of using it to undermine Sunni rule. Yet, ironically, classical Sunni sources themselves contain precedents and rulings that permit deception toward non-Muslims, particularly in the context of conflict. This includes the famous prophetic statement:
“War is deceit (al-ḥarb khidʿa).” (Sahih al-Bukhari 3030; also in multiple narrations in Bukhari and Muslim)
Radical Islamist ideologues today interpret this broadly. They treat the relationship with non-Muslims as a state of perpetual struggle, even absent open hostilities, and thereby justify deception in peacetime.
The Prototype: The Killing of Ka‘b ibn al-Ashraf
The most frequently cited example is the killing of the Jewish poet Ka‘b ibn al-Ashraf. He was a member of Banu Nadir who enjoyed protection under the Constitution of Medina.
Primary sources (Sirat Rasul Allah by Ibn Ishaq/Ibn Hisham, Sahih al-Bukhari 4037, Sunan Abi Dawud 3000) relate the following:
- After the Muslim victory at Badr, Ka‘b composed poetry lamenting the Quraysh dead and incited them against the Muslims.
- Muhammad reportedly asked, “Who will rid me of Ka‘b ibn al-Ashraf, for he has harmed Allah and His Messenger?”
- Muhammad ibn Maslama volunteered but requested, “O Messenger of Allah, we will have to tell lies to him.” The Prophet replied, “Say what you like. You are free in the matter” (or in some variants: “You may say whatever you need to say”).
Ibn Maslama and a small group then did the following:
- They pretended to be disillusioned with Muhammad and critical of him.
- They gained Ka‘b’s trust by complaining about the economic burden of supporting the Muslim emigrants.
- They lured him out at night under the pretext of a private conversation and a loan.
- They killed him with swords.
At the time, no official declared war existed between the Muslims and Banu Nadir. The Constitution of Medina was in force, and Banu Nadir continued living peacefully in Medina for another 18–20 months until their expulsion in 4 AH over a separate incident.
Classical Muslim sources portray Ka‘b’s incitement as a breach of treaty and an act of war, but the method explicitly relied on deception during a period of formal peace.
Battlefield Deception vs. Peacetime Political Killing
Deception in open battle is universal across cultures and religions.
What distinguishes the Ka‘b precedent in classical Sunni literature is that it occurred outside any battlefield, during a formal peace pact, against a civilian protected by treaty, and by using lies to exploit hospitality and disarm the target.
But here’s the problem:
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There is no record in any early source of Muhammad sending a delegation to Banu Nadhir, Ka'b’s own tribe, to demand that they take action against him for violating the pact.
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According to the Constitution of Medina, such disputes were supposed to be handled through negotiation or tribal mediation first.
Instead, Muhammad bypassed all such formal steps and directly ordered Ka'b’s assassination.
This strongly suggests that there were no formal legal grounds or solid arguments against Ka'b based on treaty violation. The justification used was primarily perceived threat or offense from his poetry, not any confirmed, actionable breach of the Medina pact.
Moreover, it was a common practice of Muhammad as we can see in some other cases too.
For example, the killing of the Jewish poet Abu Afak is consistently reported in primary Islamic historical sources (Ibn Isḥāq, Al-Wāqidī) as a political assassination carried out at night. He was not involved in any war against the Muslim community, but he was politically against Muhammad.
Ibn Ishaq gives the following lines attributed to Abu Afak (an elderly Jewish poet from Banu ʿAmr b. ʿAwf who criticized Muhammad):
طَالَ مَا عَاشَ فِي الْحَيَاةِ حِبْرٌ وَأَنَا لِمَا أَرَى مِنْ أَمْرِكُمْ أَعْجَبُ أَلَا مَنْ كَانَ لَهُ عَقْلٌ يَعْقِلُ يَتَّبِعُ رَجُلًا مِنْ تِهَامَةَ مُهَاجِرًا لَيْسَ بِذِي فَضْلٍ وَلَا مَالٍ وَلَا حَسَبٍ أَمَا تَعْجَبُونَ مِنْ رَجُلٍ يَأْتِيكُمْ بِالْحَلَالِ وَالْحَرَامِ وَأَنْتُمْ أَهْلُ وَادٍ وَاحِدٍ
Standard English translation (Guillaume, p. 675):
“Long have I lived with the community, and never did I see A people more obedient to their chief than you, Or more divided by a rider (i.e. Muhammad) who came from afar, Saying ‘This is lawful and this is forbidden’ To a people who had no religion before.”
Al-Waqidi recorded (link):
When Abu Afak recited his poem, the Messenger of Allah (Muhammad) said: "Who will deal with this wicked man for me?" Sālim bin ʿUmayr said: "I will, O Messenger of Allah," and he vowed to kill him. Sālim bin ʿUmayr went out and watched until it was a night with intense heat, and Abu Afak was sleeping outside in his yard on his mattress. He was a very old man who had reached one hundred and twenty years. So he placed the sword on his liver and pressed it with force until it pierced his mattress and killed him. No one felt it until his wife heard his voice (gasp).
This stealth operation ensured there was no fight, no warning, and no witnesses to the killing, firmly establishing the act as Ightiyāl (assassination) rather than open combat.
Classical Juristic Framework: Dar al-Islam vs. Dar al-Harb
Classical Sunni jurists (across all four madhhabs) divided the world into two categories:
- Dar al-Islam: Territory under Muslim sovereignty where Sharia applies.
- Dar al-Harb: All other territory, literally “abode of war.”
In Dar al-Harb, many rulings assume a default state of hostility. Deception, ambush, and breaking treaties (if strategically advantageous) are often permitted because permanent peace with non-Muslims is impossible until they submit (Quran 8:39, 9:29). Truces (hudna) are temporary tactical pauses, not genuine peace. The maximum duration is 10 years in most views, and they are renewable only if Muslims remain weak.
However, some scholars (e.g., al-Ghazali, al-Nawawi) limit “war is deceit” to actual military contexts. Lying in ordinary peacetime dealings is prohibited.
Nevertheless, hardline and Salafi interpretations (drawing on Ibn Taymiyyah, later Salafi scholars, and modern radicals like Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, and ISIS ideologues) treat the entire non-Muslim world as Dar al-Harb permanently. For them, the Ka‘b precedent shows that individual or covert operations against “enemies of Islam” justify deception even under modern citizenship or visa agreements.
The Radical Application Today
Moderate Muslims and contemporary moderate scholars reject it. They argue the West falls under Dar al-‘Ahd or Dar al-Sulh (abode of treaty), where covenants of citizenship must be honoured.
Yet radical networks explicitly cite “war is deceit” and the Ka‘b model:
- Al-Qaeda manuals (e.g., The Management of Savagery) and ISIS propaganda reference the Ka‘b assassination to permit false identities, feigned moderation, and surprise attacks.
- European jihadists (e.g., the Charlie Hebdo attackers, some Bataclan perpetrators) lived outwardly secular lives while planning attacks. This is precisely the kind of long-term dissimulation radicals derive from these precedents.
In the radical worldview, no true peace exists with non-Muslims. Citizenship, visas, and public pledges of loyalty are merely modern equivalents of Muhammad ibn Maslama’s lies to Ka‘b. They become tactical tools in an ongoing war.
Conclusion
The prophetic statement “war is deceit” and the precedent of Ka‘b ibn al-Ashraf are authentic and undisputed in Sunni sources. Moderate Muslim scholarship limits them to legitimate wartime strategy. But as long as influential radical voices interpret the non-Muslim world as perpetual Dar al-Harb, these texts will continue to be weaponized to justify deception, infiltration, and violence, even in countries where Muslims live in safety and prosperity.
Understanding this doctrinal tension is essential for Western security services, policymakers, and Muslim reformers alike.
Hassan Radwan