Using Holocaust laws to defend Islamic Blasphemy Laws

Issues with Blasphemy and Apostasy Laws in Several Muslim-Majority Countries

These laws raise profound concerns when examined in light of universal human rights and ordinary human behaviour. The main problems are as follows:

1. They run counter to basic human nature Strong disagreements and heated debates frequently produce emotional outbursts and harsh words. People across all cultures and eras react this way when deeply held beliefs are challenged. Criminalising spontaneous or passionate language as a capital offence effectively punishes a normal feature of human discourse.
2. The Quran itself uses strong derogatory language against opponents Many verses describe those who reject the message with phrases such as “the worst of creatures” (98:6), “like cattle” (7:179), “deaf, dumb, and blind” (2:171), or employ other severe condemnations (e.g., 68:10-13). Islamic tradition attributes these words directly to divine revelation. If the text regarded as God’s perfect speech contains such expressions, it is difficult to demand that ordinary people consistently display greater restraint than the Quran itself does.
3. In practice, almost all criticism is labelled as blasphemy In a number of countries, no clear boundary exists between legitimate critique and alleged insult. As a result, scholarly books, articles, public speeches, or even private conversations that question historical narratives, specific doctrines, or traditional rulings are routinely classified as blasphemous.
4. Freedom to criticise or leave the religion is effectively eliminated Publishing works that examine problematic aspects of Islamic history or theology is prohibited. Delivering speeches that invite reflection on difficult issues is forbidden. Persuading someone to reconsider or abandon their faith (apostasy) is treated as an attack on Islam itself and remains punishable by death or lengthy imprisonment in several jurisdictions.

These laws and their application do not simply protect religious sensibilities. They create an environment in which honest discussion, academic inquiry, and individual freedom of conscience regarding Islam become practically impossible. Such restrictions conflict with internationally recognised standards of freedom of opinion, expression, and religion that are supposed to apply equally to every person, regardless of the faith they were born into or presently hold.

Common Arguments Used to Defend Blasphemy Laws

Many Muslim preachers and apologists present the following points when justifying strict blasphemy and apostasy laws in Muslim-majority countries:

1. Every society imposes some limits on individual behaviour, and Islamic societies are no exception. Rules exist everywhere to maintain order.
2. Western countries also restrict freedom of expression. For example, several European nations have laws against Holocaust denial, and some jurisdictions treat deliberate misgendering or the refusal to use preferred pronouns as discriminatory or hateful conduct.
3. Large online platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and X (formerly Twitter) enforce their own community guidelines and remove content that violates those rules. If private companies can set standards for acceptable speech, then Muslim-majority nations should similarly be allowed to establish and enforce their own standards within their borders.
4. Consequently, if the Muslim community in a given country decides, through its laws and institutions, that criticism or ridicule of God, the Prophet Muhammad, or core Islamic beliefs is unacceptable, outsiders from the West have no moral basis to object. After all, Western societies already accept comparable restrictions in other areas.

These arguments are frequently raised in public debates and online discussions to portray blasphemy laws not as unique or oppressive, but as one legitimate variation of the restrictions that every society, including liberal democracies, places on absolute freedom of expression.

You can see these same arguments made by Islamic debater Daniel Haqiqatjou in this debate between a Muslim debater and an Atheist debater. 

Examining the Claim: “Every society imposes restrictions, so Islamic blasphemy laws are no different”

Muslim apologists often argue: “Every state places some limits on its citizens. Islamic countries are simply doing the same thing when they enforce blasphemy and apostasy laws.”

This comparison does not hold up under scrutiny for the following reasons:

1. Not all restrictions are morally or legally equivalent Reasonable limits (such as prohibitions on direct incitement to violence, hate speech, and defamation of living individuals) are narrowly tailored and serve to protect the equal rights of others. In contrast, laws that criminalise peaceful criticism, scholarly analysis, or ridicule of ideas, historical figures, or religious doctrines are fundamentally different in nature and effect.

2. Banning criticism is a hallmark of authoritarian rule, not a normal “restriction” If the mere existence of any restriction justified every other restriction, authoritarian regimes and dictatorships could (and do) use the exact same logic to silence all political opposition, independent journalism, and peaceful dissent. “We are only imposing community standards” becomes an empty phrase that can justify any abuse of power.

3. Blasphemy and apostasy laws go far beyond ordinary limits on speech In a number of Muslim-majority countries governed by traditional interpretations of Sharia:

   • Any questioning of the historical accuracy of the Quran or the moral example of the Prophet can be punished with imprisonment or death.
   • Academic works, cartoons, novels, or even private conversations that are deemed disrespectful are treated as capital offences.
   • Changing one’s religion or persuading others to leave Islam (apostasy) is punishable by death in at least ten countries and by lengthy imprisonment in others.

   These are not minor regulations on manners or hate speech. They are systematic tools for preventing open discussion and enforcing lifelong adherence to a single ideology under threat of execution.

In short, equating narrowly defined, rights-protecting limits with total bans on criticising a religion or leaving it is a false equivalence. The first preserves human dignity and freedom; the second eliminates them.

Examining the Claim: “Western countries restrict speech too (Holocaust denial laws, misgendering rules, etc.), so blasphemy laws are comparable”

This is the second common argument used to defend Islamic blasphemy laws. It rests on a series of false equivalences.

1. Laws against Holocaust denial: These laws exist in some European countries that directly experienced the Holocaust or Nazi occupation. They serve two purposes. Firstly, they are narrowly designed to prevent the deliberate falsification of a well-documented genocide that killed six million Jews and millions of others. Secondly, they protect a historically persecuted and nearly exterminated minority from speech that has repeatedly been used to prepare further violence against living people. In contrast, blasphemy laws in Muslim-majority countries are enforced by a powerful religious majority (often over 90–99 % of the population) to defend their religion against any criticism.

2. Protections for LGBT individuals (e.g., rules against deliberate misgendering or hate speech): In most Western jurisdictions, legal consequences arise only when speech crosses into targeted harassment, incitement to violence, or workplace discrimination against a small and historically persecuted minority. These measures aim to prevent real-world harm (assaults, job loss, bullying, and suicide) that have followed centuries of systematic stigmatisation. Blasphemy laws, however, are not about shielding a powerless minority from violence. They are used by a dominant majority to punish peaceful expression (books, cartoons, academic lectures, or private change of belief) that causes no physical harm to anyone.

3. Historical example: Racial slurs such as the N-word Social and (in some contexts) legal sanctions against certain racial epithets arose because those words were weaponised for centuries to dehumanise, segregate, and justify violence against enslaved and oppressed minorities. Even today, no Western country imposes the death penalty or life imprisonment for using a racial slur. At most, such language may lead to civil penalties or social consequences. Blasphemy laws, by contrast, routinely prescribe death or decades in prison for mere words or drawings that offend religious sensibilities.

Key distinction:

• Western measures (where they exist) are limited, contextual, and overwhelmingly designed to protect people from small, historically vulnerable groups from further harm.
• Blasphemy and apostasy laws in several Muslim-majority countries are broad, absolute, and enforced by a powerful majority to silence dissent, prevent scholarship, and trap individuals in a religion they may no longer believe.

Equating the two is not only inaccurate, but it inverts the power relationship entirely. One set of rules tries to shield the weak from the strong. The other empowers the strong to punish the weak for thought and expression.

PS:

Although Holocaust laws are there only in order to provide protection to a persecuted minority of people, still half of the Western world (including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the Scandinavian nations) itself doesn't agree with them and considers it to be against the freedom of expression. Even all Islamic countries themselves consider Holocaust Laws against the freedom of expression, and none of them made a law that denying the genocide of Jews is a crime. But these same Islamic countries still want to use this same Holocaust law in order to defend their unjust blasphemy laws. 

Thus, Holocaust-denial laws (limited and controversial as they are) cannot legitimately be used to defend blasphemy and apostasy laws, especially by those who reject the former on free-speech grounds while enforcing the latter with far greater severity. The argument defeats itself.

Third Argument: Protecting People vs. Protecting an Ideology

A fundamental distinction exists between laws that protect living human beings from harm and laws that shield ideas, doctrines, or religious figures from criticism.

1. Laws against Holocaust denial, anti-LGBT hate speech, or racial slurs These measures (where they exist) are designed to protect vulnerable groups of people from targeted harassment, incitement to violence, or the revival of ideologies that have led to their mass murder or systemic oppression. They focus on preventing real-world harm to individuals and communities.
2. No Western law protects a religion or ideology from criticism
   • You can criticise, mock, or reject Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, atheism, liberalism, or any other belief system as harshly as you wish. No one faces prison or death for doing so.
   • You can argue that LGBT identities or lifestyles are morally wrong, biologically unnatural, or socially harmful. In most Western countries you remain fully free to make that case in books, speeches, articles, or sermons. Legal consequences arise only when speech crosses into direct harassment, incitement to violence, or workplace discrimination against identifiable individuals.
3. Blasphemy laws do the opposite They protect a belief system and its central figures (the Quran, the Prophet Muhammad, and core Islamic doctrines) from any form of criticism, satire, scholarly scrutiny, or even peaceful rejection. The “victim” that the law defends is not a living person or persecuted minority—it is an ideology and a historical figure. Peaceful expression that causes no physical harm is met with imprisonment or execution.

In short: Western restrictions (limited and often debated as they are) aim to protect human beings from violence and discrimination. Blasphemy and apostasy laws aim to protect a religion from questioning or disbelief.

Conflating the two erases the crucial difference between shielding the weak from harm and shielding powerful ideas from scrutiny. They are not comparable.

Fourth Argument: “If Facebook and X can set community guidelines, why can’t Islamic states set their own rules?”

This analogy sounds plausible at first, but it breaks down immediately when the fundamental distinction between private platforms and the state is applied.

1. These platforms are "Private" and joining them is "Voluntary

   ": Facebook, X, YouTube, or any private website is not a government. Users are not forced to join them against their wish, but they choose whether to join or not, and they can leave at any time. 

2. A state is not private property:
   People are born in states and they have no personal choice in this matter where they are born. Moreover, no citizen can “leave” a country as easily as they leave a social-media platform, especially when apostasy or critical speech is punishable by imprisonment or death. Passports, visas, family ties, and financial realities make relocation extremely difficult or impossible for most people. Citizens do not “sign up” to be governed; they are born into a legal system or acquire citizenship under conditions they did not freely negotiate.

3. The state has a duty to protect the universal human rights of all citizens:
   Unlike a private company that can prioritise profit or ideology, a modern state is bound by its own constitution and by the international human-rights treaties it has signed. These obligations include guaranteeing freedom of opinion, expression, conscience, and religion for every individual without exception. A private owner can ban whatever he wants on his own server; a government cannot lawfully strip citizens of fundamental rights on the grounds that “this is our community standard.”

4. Private Muslim owners are indeed free to run strict platforms:
   If a Muslim billionaire tomorrow launches a social network that forbids all criticism of Islam, no one can force him to change the rules. People who dislike those rules are free to stay away. That is the essence of private property and freedom of association. But the moment the same rules are imposed by the state on every citizen, with prison or death as the penalty for violation, then they cease to be private guidelines and become authoritarian coercion.

In summary, private platforms offer a choice of “take it or leave it.” States offer no such choice. That is why a government is never allowed to enforce the same kind of ideological uniformity that a private website may adopt for itself. Blasphemy laws imposed by the state violate the non-negotiable human rights of citizens in a way that private community guidelines never can. The two situations are entirely incommensurable. 

Conclusion: The Need for Honest Reciprocity and Universal Standards

The common defences offered for blasphemy and apostasy laws do not withstand scrutiny. These laws cannot be legitimately compared to Western measures against Holocaust denial, targeted hate speech, or private platform guidelines. The differences in purpose, scope, power dynamics, and consequences are too great.

What remains is a clear asymmetry that in many non-Muslim countries, Muslims enjoy full legal freedom to preach Islam, build mosques, distribute the Quran, and persuade others of their faith, even when their message strongly criticises Christianity, Judaism, atheism, Hinduism, or secular liberalism. In a significant number of Muslim-majority countries governed by traditional interpretations of Sharia, however, non-Muslims (and dissenting Muslims) are denied the reciprocal right to question Islam, examine its scriptures critically, or leave the faith without risking imprisonment or death.

This one-sided arrangement inevitably breeds resentment. Public opinion in open societies does not form in a vacuum, but people see the contrast between the freedoms they grant and the freedoms that are denied to others under the same religious banner. Persistent double standards and demanding full rights in the West while enforcing severe restrictions at home just fuel distrust far more effectively than any caricature or conspiracy theory ever could.

Blaming the resulting tension entirely on “Islamophobia” misses the point. Genuine phobia is irrational fear, but unease rooted in observable, systemic inequality is a rational response to injustice. Lasting mutual respect can only grow when the same freedoms are extended in both directions.

A request to progressive and liberal voices in the West is if the goal is truly to reduce prejudice against ordinary Muslims and to protect Muslim minorities from discrimination, then campaigning against blasphemy and apostasy laws must become a priority. These laws are not obscure relics, but they are actively enforced today and they directly contradict the universal principles of freedom of conscience and expression that most progressives claim to uphold.

History offers a precedent where the abolition of slavery in many Muslim lands did not happen primarily through internal reform alone, but sustained moral and diplomatic pressure from the wider world played a decisive role. The same principled, non-violent pressure is needed now to bring blasphemy and apostasy laws in line with recognised human-rights standards.

Only when criticism of any religion is as legally safe in Lahore, Cairo, or Tehran as it is in London, New York, or Paris will the foundation for genuine, reciprocal tolerance be laid. Until then, calls for the West to “do more” against Islamophobia will ring hollow to many, because the most powerful step toward reducing fear and hostility lies in ending the fear and hostility that state-enforced blasphemy laws create.